Emotional Intelligence as an Intellectual Virtue: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Assessment by Poenicke, Paul
Phenomenology and Mind, n. 11 - 2016, pp. 58-67
DOI: 10.13128/Phe_Mi-20106
Web: www.fupress.net/index.php/pam
© The Author(s) 2016
CC BY 4.0 Firenze University Press
ISSN 2280-7853 (print) - ISSN 2239-4028 (on line)
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE: 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND 
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
abstract
Virtue theory has long recognized the significance of emotion for cognition, yet little philosophical 
research has been dedicated to identifying an intellectual virtue related to emotion. Applying recent 
work in virtue epistemology reveals emotional intelligence (EI) to be an intellectual virtue, as analysis 
demonstrates EI’s ability to enhance cognition. High EI persons better attend to epistemically-significant 
features of the environment, which could explain the significance of stakes for knowledge attribution. 
While testing did not confirm higher EI with stakes sensitivity (the hypothesis), study methods, including 
stakes vignettes, inadvertently caused the hypothesis to be disconfirmed.
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EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
It is not a fluke that Daniel Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence begins with an introduction 
entitled “Aristotle’s Challenge,” that itself, appropriately, opens with the philosopher’s 
words concerning “being angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, 
for the right purpose, and in the right way” (Goleman 1994: ix). Aristotle’s words reflect 
virtue theory’s traditional appreciation of emotion, and a recent volume advancing virtue 
epistemology, Robert C. Roberts and E. Jay Wood’s Intellectual Virtues, has much to add to this 
legacy of emotional analysis, particularly to improve theoretical and experimental research on 
emotional intelligence (EI), the focus of this paper. Section I is devoted to outlining emotional 
intelligence, in particular John Mayer and Peter Salovey’s four branch model, which defines EI 
as the ability to perceive, understand, utilize, and regulate emotion (Meyer and Salovey 1997: 
399). After defending the Mayer-Salovey model and exploring the model through an excursus 
into emotional deception, Section II introduces Intellectual Virtues and its definition of virtue 
to argue that emotional intelligence is rightly considered an intellectual virtue, and how, as 
an intellectual virtue, emotional intelligence is related to epistemic success through emotion’s 
epistemically-relevant features and functions. 
Section III reports a study that tested the significance of emotional intelligence as an 
intellectual virtue. Professional philosophers and non-philosophers disagree upon the 
significance of stakes for knowledge attribution, and emotional intelligence, with its ability 
to focus the mind upon epistemically-significant features of an individual’s environment, was 
hypothesized as a key factor in whether a participant was sensitive to changes in stakes and 
the resulting impact upon their attribution of knowledge. After correlating each participant’s 
response to low and high stakes versions of popular vignettes in the literature (BRIDGE, BANK, 
and PINE NUTS) and that participant’s emotional intelligence, results were mixed. Given the 
extreme length of the study and problems with the vignettes, one cannot disconfirm EI as an 
intellectual virtue based upon the empirical data. Emotional intelligence emerges from this 




While the term ‘emotional intelligence’ has been used since the mid-20th century, 
psychological research concerning the concept did not appear until the 1990s. Inspired by 
the work of John Mayer, Peter Salovey, and others, Daniel Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence 
was published in 1995 and became a best seller, prompting a flood of popular works and 
encouraging further academic research. Within the psychological community, the nascent 
field of emotional intelligence has split between ability and skill based models. Ability based 
models are devoted solely to measuring mental abilities, such as recognition and knowledge, 
regarding emotion and emotion’s interaction with cognition; mixed models take a broader 
view of emotional intelligence, consider emotional intelligence as a single entity that has 
intellectual, social, and motivational aspects (Schulze and Roberts 2005: 399-405).  
Which model of emotional intelligence is best? An ability model, particularly the four branch 
Mayer and Salovey model, has several distinct advantages1. Ability models focus on the 
‘intelligence’ of emotional intelligence, directing their attention to those emotion-related 
aspects of cognition omitted by traditional views of intelligence. Mixed models tend to see 
emotional intelligence as a wide range of skills and abilities that extend far beyond ordinary 
and technical definitions of intelligence, muddying the meaning of ‘intelligence.’ By focusing 
on the interaction between emotion and cognition—emotional perception, regulation, and 
reasoning—research is far more fruitful: comparisons with traditional intelligence can 
be directly ascertained, complicated questions regarding emotions and their impact on 
behaviors and skills can be avoided, and fruitful tests measuring emotional intelligence can 
be constructed. While the focused study of emotional intelligence is only in its second decade, 
evidence leads many to believe that Mayer and Salovey’s model, and ability models generally, 
has the greatest evidential support among models of emotional intelligence, which has made 
it the favorite of both supporters and critics of emotional intelligence (Schulze and Roberts 
2005: 31-51, 309-342; Matthews, G., Zeidner, M., and Roberts 2002: 31-79, 511-551). Therefore, it 
seems that if we want to utilize a technical definition of emotional intelligence, then the work 
of Mayer and Salovey should be given primacy. 
Mayer and Salovey’s understanding of emotional intelligence is broken down into four 
branches or levels of skills or abilities. First, there is the perception and expression of emotion, 
as one identifies and expresses emotions subjectively and in extra-personal contexts, whether 
in others, a piece of art, or an animal2. Second, emotion is assimilated into thought. A person 
is able to weigh diverging emotions, consider when emotions seem inappropriate in a 
context, and directly attend to and compare emotions—say, examining one’s subjective fear 
or excitement regarding two different events. Understanding and reasoning about emotions, 
the third skill, allows us to cognitively interact with emotions by labeling emotions and 
recognizing the difference between phenomenologically similar feelings (such as anticipation 
and nervousness), appreciating how emotions can change (from extreme fear to relief after 
the resolution of a frightening episode), and grasping the connection between our emotions 
and various contexts. The final level of emotional intelligence, its apogee, involves the 
reflective regulation and management of emotions. This includes being able to monitor one’s 
own emotions and promote emotion and intellectual growth, as well as helping to regulate 
another’s emotions (Mayer and Salovey 1997: 396-417). 
A brief excursus concerning emotional deception will help to further explain the model and 
1  Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000), summarizes the previous work done by Mayer and Salovey. 
2  Roberts and Woods would emphasize that perception is a form of acquaintance, where one is either in immediate 
cognitive contact with something or has had such contact and still retains that information through memory, 
understanding, or another ability (Roberts and Wood 2007: 50-51).
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highlight the importance of emotional intelligence. Emotions routinely deceive: irrational 
fears, especially those that persist even after we grasp reasons for not being afraid, exist as 
unpleasant reminders that emotions routinely trick us into holding false beliefs. However, 
if we have emotional intelligence, then we can anticipate the myriad of ways emotions can 
lead us astray and, through various methods, discourage its disruption of rationality. Such 
emotional subterfuge is not necessarily difficult to detect, if time and effort is made to 
understand our own psychologies. Gaining an initial perception of our emotions and their 
dispositions to distort might come from meditation, where individual emotions could be felt 
and analyzed; reading literature, where we could see how others’ emotions lead to harmful 
effects and appreciate how emotionally mature characters recognized their emotions; or 
journaling, where one writes out what one is feeling, considers the emotion in question, and 
then reassesses one’s emotional experiences. A person could also read books like Emotional 
Intelligence to further enhance their understanding of emotions; they could take tests, such 
as Mayer and Salovey’s Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale Study (MSCEIT), to see how 
well he can recognize and analyze emotions. Once emotions are perceived, we can then begin 
to express them, which will promote further perception of emotion in ourselves and others, 
allowing us to recognize and overcome emotions’ occasional invisibility. This initial step would 
allow us to appreciate emotional deception, but it would be further work that would be refined 
as emotional analysis and understanding (the third level of Mayer and Salovey’s model), 
that would substantially reduce and correct emotional deception. Such refining would be 
especially critical to remove emotional triggers, and include an appreciation of how emotions 
can change, an investigation into the causes and results of certain emotional reactions, an 
exploration of the differences and similarities in emotions, and a realization of how moods, 
feelings, and emotions are connected. With such emotional analysis and understanding in 
place, a person can finally focus on how to regulate emotions—what management skills are 
necessary to reduce the impact of harmful emotions, how to encourage helpful feelings, and 
how to stay open to emotional experiences in ways that encourage intellectual and emotional 
growth (Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2000a: 400-401).
In Intellectual Virtues, Roberts and Wood propose that virtue is, “...an acquired based of 
excellent functioning in some generically human sphere of activity that is challenging 
and important” (Roberts and Wood 2007: 59). Salovey and Meyer’s definition of emotional 
intelligence “…as the ability to perceive and express emotion, assimilate emotion in thought, 
understand and reason with emotion in thought, and regulate emotion in the self and others” 
(Meyer and Salovey 1997: 399-401) is an intellectual virtue in the eyes of Roberts and Wood. 
An initial doubt might derive from Salovey and Meyer’s assertion that emotional intelligence 
is an ability, not excellent functioning, although, given Salovey and Mayer’s philosophically 
non-technical, fairly loose use of ‘ability,’ this definition of emotional intelligence as an ability 
could probably be expanded to include excellent functioning as well. Additionally, Roberts 
and Wood assert that many virtues are dispositions of the will, including emotions; further, 
as shown in the above discussion regarding emotional deception, emotional intelligence 
would be a virtue, since it is a disposition that “…correct(s) for proneness to dysfunction 
and error in certain common situations” (Roberts and Wood 2007: 59). One might also argue 
that emotional intelligence is a particular faculty—the innate or natural “powers” possessed 
by every human being—whose maturation, development, and perfection has made it into a 
state of virtue (Roberts and Wood 2007: 59). For a variety of reasons, emotional intelligence 
would appear to count as a virtue for Roberts and Wood. With this in mind, the rest of the 
definition is easily achieved: emotional intelligence is certainly an acquired, not inherited or 






a wide variety of occasions; and it is certainly challenging to acquire and critical to possess. 
Emotional intelligence fulfills other characteristics Roberts and Wood find in virtues—virtues 
are correctives for human defections, the product of a formation in human excellence or 
“education for life” (Roberts and Wood 2007: 69, 165). Thus, it seems as if Roberts and Wood 
would include emotional intelligence as a “disposition of intellectual excellence” that is 
necessary to correct the “…perennial set of deficiencies which in every generation need to be 
corrected” (Roberts and Wood 2007: 22). 
It is clear that Roberts and Wood appreciate the importance of emotions, and Intellectual 
Virtues, in chapters on practices and practical wisdom, further explores the value of emotional 
intelligence. Roberts and Wood emphasize that good reading requires an appreciation and 
appropriation of emotions associated with Derridaian and Gadmerian reading styles—a 
sense of creativity and joy balanced with a concern for respect and diligence (Roberts and 
Wood 2007: 123-133). Public debate requires generosity to appreciate another’s position, 
meekness to encourage a free and welcoming discussion, and friendliness to enjoy protracted 
disagreements over fundamental issues (Roberts and Wood 2007: 134-140). Teaching requires 
patience with students’ sometimes offbeat questions, harshness to overcome intellectual sloth, 
and honesty to represent all positions fairly; a student needs to be open to learn new things 
and enthusiastic to discover new truths. Intellectual practices require emotional regulation 
and promotion, critical aspects of emotional intelligence.
These facts would be included in practical wisdom, Aristotle’s phronesis, the intellectual side 
of virtue that focuses reason and judgment on these matters of practice. Practical wisdom 
is both deliberative, the active planning of a solution, and perceptive, passively taking in 
a context and its relevant facts. Perceiving, assimilating, understanding, and regulating 
emotions—the four skills of the Mayer-Salovey model—are critical to both the deliberative 
and perceptive powers of practical wisdom, as Roberts and Wood’s example of the college 
president demonstrates3. During apartheid, a college president wants to show solidarity with 
South African blacks by hosting an open debate concerning the appropriateness of divesting 
university funds from South Africa as a manner of promoting justice. Practical wisdom allows 
him to perceive that his students might be angered by such debate; that a difficult that debate 
is critical for intellectual honesty; and that his own proclivity for intellectual cowardice has 
kept him from acting in accord with his love of knowledge in the past. Practical wisdom 
also allows the president to take active control of his emotions through self-management 
strategies, to empathize with certain portions of the college community, and how to make 
an open debate an inviting, non-threatening place to voice opinions. Without emotional 
intelligence, practical wisdom may be blind to helping the president appropriately perceive 
and act in this situation. 
Beyond its impact upon practical rationality, emotional intelligence indirectly impacts belief 
and knowledge through its regulation and management of emotions, which, according to 
Georg Brun and Dominique Kuenzle, are highlighted by five epistemically-relevant features 
and functions (Brun and Kuenzle 2008: 16-22). First, emotions provide enhanced motivational 
force for epistemological study: surprise, doubt, and puzzlement promote further reflection 
on epistemological questions, encourage rigorous research, and force us to focus on troubling 
issues and arguments. Without emotions such as doubt, many philosophical projects, from 
Socratic ignorance to Cartesian skepticism, may never have been initiated. Second, emotions 
help us determine salience and relevance. Philosophy takes place within a sphere of limitation: 
the beings that conduct philosophical investigation cannot pursue every line of inquiry, 
3  Roberts and Woods: 138-140, 313-315.
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question, or objection; emotions are spotlights that, encompassing our attitudes, concerns, 
and beliefs, focus debate on what is significant and pertinent. Third, emotions offer access 
to facts and beliefs, either in a unique—that is, it is solely because of emotions that we have 
such epistemic access—or dispensable manner, where other states could provide such access. 
Emotions could also contribute in non-propositional ways to knowledge and understanding. 
This fourth feature would include the arrangement of categories and other forms of cognitive 
organization, as well as standards of inquiry and warrant. Finally, emotion allows for 
epistemic efficiency: emotion certainly makes it easier to perform certain epistemic tasks, as 
intuitive thinking that relies upon emotion allows for quick, accurate responses to various 
environments. 
Simply identifying emotional intelligence as a virtue and considering its general significance 
for epistemology falls short of assessing whether EI actually functions as a virtue to resolve a 
genuine epistemic controversy. This section discusses a study that tested the significance of 
emotional intelligence as a key cause of sensitivity to stakes effects on knowledge attribution. 
Until the late 1980s, philosophers investigating the conditions for knowledge attribution 
presumed that such conditions are based upon truth-relevant factors, those elements 
which are able to increase or lower the likelihood of the subject’s belief that p is true – e.g. 
justification, reliability, and evidence. In the last few decades, several researchers started to 
inquire whether features of the conversational context and truth-irrelevant factors, such 
as the subject’s error possibilities and other practical interests, might affect knowledge 
attributions as well. Contextualists (DeRose 2009) argued for a controversial thesis: in certain 
conversational contexts, particularly in those situations where error possibilities have been 
raised, it may no longer be true that an individual knows, even if that individual knew in 
contexts when those error possibilities had not been raised. Responding to the contextualist 
challenge included Jason Stanley (Sripada and Stanley 2012), who argued that practical 
interests matter as an epistemic fact about a situation. According to Stanley’s interest-relative 
invariantism (IRI), whether we should attribute knowledge in a given situation is not based 
on the conversation context, as suggested by contextualists; rather, “the truth conditions 
of a sentence like ‘S knows that p’ fluctuate according to what is at stake for the subject” 
(Buckwalter 2010: 396). 
Previous experiments have revealed a surprising insensitivity on the part of ordinary subjects 
to stakes in various experiments attempting to confirm contextualism or IRI4. If emotional 
intelligence is a virtue and hones the epistemic advantages of emotions, then EI could provide 
the kind of epistemically-significant sensitivity towards stakes that has yet to be discovered. 
Emotions aid individuals in determining the salience and relevance of reasons and evidence. 
Emotion is uniquely connected with action, as emotions provide motivation through both fast 
responses to immediate stimuli and slow responses to quotidian issues via engrained moods, 
propensities, and regulation. The raising and lowering of stakes would be of great significance 
for practical rationality, which, as discussed in Section II, requires emotional intelligence. 
This sensitivity to changes in stakes would appear in testing through a number of different 
features of the high EI individual. The emotionally-intelligent person would have an enhanced 
ability to use emotional perception, regulation, and reasoning to better motivate themselves 
to analyze and answer confusing vignettes, providing researchers with determined, engaged 
participants. The emotionally intelligent person is also more empathic, which will make it 
easier for that individual to insert themselves into a vignette and determine the impact of 
4  See Buckwalter and Schaffer (2013) for a history of the experimental literature on stakes. 
3. Testing 
Emotional 




stakes on that individual’s epistemic situation. Finally, emotions allow for more ready access 
to intuitions and intuitive responses that are being tested in experimental philosophy. 
The study aimed to uncover what kind of individual differences exist in responses to widely 
discussed epistemological cases between participants who score highly on tests of emotional 
intelligence versus participants with low scores on such tests. The main hypothesis was 
that high EI subjects demonstrate a higher sensitivity to the impact of stakes on evidential 
standards than low EI subjects. 
Sixty undergraduate students at a public university participated in the study in exchange 
for extra credit in one of their courses. Students were predominantly Anglo-American, with 
roughly equal proportions of male and female students and an average age of twenty. Each 
student spent between forty-five to sixty minutes completing the test materials, which were 
given in different sequences to eliminate ordering effects. The study materials consisted of 
two elements, the first being Mayer and Salovey’s Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale 
Study (MSCEIT), the one hundred forty-one item test composed by Mayer and Salovey to 
measure emotional intelligence. 
The second part of the study materials featured three sets of vignettes: BRIDGE, BANK, 
and PINE NUTS. Each participant received three vignettes, one from each set, in which the 
protagonist is in either in high or low stakes. The simplest set of vignettes, BRIDGE, came from 
Feltz and Zarpentine (2010). The low stakes vignette is as follows:  
John is driving a truck along a dirt road toward a remote mountain village so that he 
can study the culture of the people that live there. He comes across a rickety wooden 
bridge over a shallow ditch. John thinks to himself, “The bridge should be stable enough 
to support the weight of my truck.” He then drives the truck onto the bridge and makes 
it safely over to the other side.
Stakes were raised in another variant of BRIDGE by increasing the height of the bridge (in high 
stakes, the bridge spanned a thousand foot gorge), and then amplified in a third version by 
increasing the bridge’s height and changing John’s goal (John hauls essential medicine over 
a gorge to aid a remote village, where desperately ill orphans suffer from life-threatening 
diseases). After each vignette, with 1 being ‘Strongly Disagree’ and 7 being ‘Strongly Agree’, 
participants were asked: “Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following claim: ‘John knew that the rickety wooden bridge would be stable enough to support 
his truck’”.
Participants also received a variant of BANK from Buckwalter (2010). Here is the low stakes 
version:
Sylvie and Bruno are driving home from work on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop 
at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they drive past the bank they notice that 
the lines inside are very long. Although they generally like to deposit their paychecks 
as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited 
right away. Bruno tells Sylvie, “I was just here last week and I know that the bank will 
be open on Saturday.” Instead, Bruno suggests that they drive straight home and return 
to deposit their paychecks on Saturday. When they return to the bank on Saturday, it is 
open for business.
Stakes were first raised in a second version of BANK by adding skeptical doubts (Sylvie 
suggests that banks typically are closed on the weekend, and that this bank had been closed 
on Saturday in the past). The final version raised stakes through adding Sylvie’s skeptical 
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doubts as well as including the possibility of financial peril: if Bruno cannot deposit his check 
on time, he will be in a precarious position with his creditors. After each vignette, with 1 being 
‘Strongly Disagree’ and 7 being ‘Strongly Agree’, participants were asked: “Please indicate to 
what extent you agree or disagree that Bruno’s assertion, ‘I know the bank will be open on 
Saturday,’ is true”. 
Finally, the study presented a variant of PINE NUTS from Sripada and Stanley (2012). 
Participants received the following as the low stakes version of PINE NUTS: 
Hannah likes the taste of most foods and is not a very picky eater. One evening, Hannah 
and her sister Sarah are at a brand new restaurant that has just opened up. Hannah 
orders a plate of noodles. When her food is brought to the table, Hannah notices 
something that looks like nuts sprinkled on her noodles and wonders what it is. Sarah 
says, “The noodles may be topped with pine nuts.” Hannah notes that the menu says 
her dish does not contain pine nuts. Based on this, Hannah forms the belief that her 
noodles are not topped with pine nuts.
The two additional adaptations of the vignette raised stakes by increasing Hannah’s allergic 
reaction to eating pine nuts (from dry mouth to a deadly reaction from eating a single nut). 
After each vignette, with 1 being ‘Strongly Disagree’ and 7 being ‘Strongly Agree’, participants 
were asked two questions, to directly assay the connection between evidence and knowledge 
predication: 
1) “What is the strength of Hannah’s evidence that her noodles are not topped with pine 
nuts?”
2) “Suppose it turns out that her noodles are not topped with pine nuts. Please rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with the following sentence: ‘Hannah knows her noodles are 
not topped with pine nuts.’”
For each contrasting pair of thought experiments, participant responses to these thought 
experiments were correlated with that participant’s emotional intelligence scores. 
Participants with certain ranges of scores were grouped together and statistical tests 
performed to determine if the mean responses given by each group differed significantly from 
one another. Effect sizes were measured and compared. 
From the results of our study, we were unable to confirm or deny our hypothesis, that a 
participant’s emotional intelligence determined whether the subject was sensitive to the 
impact of stakes on evidential standards for knowledge predication. Certain groups of EI 
aptitude scored on the stakes vignettes as predicted by our hypothesis, but this pattern 
confirming our hypothesis’s prediction did not occur across the ranges of high and low EI 
and resulting changes in stakes. Our results did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis, the 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between EI and sensitivity to the impact of stakes 
on evidential standards for knowledge. Furthermore, we were unable to establish a link 
between EI and sensitivity to stakes based on the significance of goals, the addition of skeptical 
hypotheses, and the connection between evidence and knowledge attribution. Unfortunately, 
this study cannot provide confirmation or disconfirmation to the contextualist or interest-
relative invariantist intuitions that motivated the studies by Feltz and Zarpentine, Buckwalter, 
and Sripada and Stanley. 
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What accounts for the uneven results? Two explanations appear plausible and should be 
considered in future work. First, mental fatigue impacted participants, who—in one sitting—
completed the lengthy MSCEIT and worked through a number of torturous vignettes. A person 
of high emotional intelligence, an individual who could manage their emotions to promote 
dedication and interest, would find themselves exhausted, providing mistaken answers, after such 
a lengthy battery of tests. If researchers want to use the MSCEIT in future work, they should allow 
participants to finish the test in one session and return for additional testing on a different day. 
The second explanation is that the construction of the vignettes confounded the study’s 
attempt to compare EI and sensitivity to stakes. Buckwalter’s experiments on bank cases—as 
well as all the studies that follow Buckwalter—repeat, without alteration, DeRose’s thought 
experiments from the late 1990s, a decade before online banking and ATMs. The standard 
study participant, an undergraduate student, lives with these modern banking convinces, 
allowing money to be deposited unencumbered by long bank lines. Students are likely 
bamboozled as to why an individual would worry about bank lines when money can be 
deposited via an ATM, and as a result, they may be responding based on intuitions completely 
unrelated to the situation, stakes, and standards of evidence. 
The vignettes in the stakes literature are written to test specific hypotheses but are not 
composed with an eye towards presenting a realistic portrait of how humans actually interact 
and live—the focus of an empathetic, emotionally intelligent person. In the high stakes bank 
case, the vignette strains credulity: Bruno’s claim that he had visited the bank the previous 
week could be rebutted by Sylvie rattling off skeptical hypotheses—banks can change their 
hours and typically close on weekends—but without her responding specifically to Bruno 
(i.e. providing him with an estimate when in the past the bank had different weekend hours), 
it seems like Bruno and Sylvie are talking past one another. An emotionally-intelligent 
individual, using their ability to empathetically place themselves in the situation to evaluate 
Bruno’s assertion, would find it difficult to make sense of whether Sylvie has actually provided 
evidence that increases the stakes. 
Sripada and Stanley state that they are concerned that providing such detail would artificially 
focus participants’ attention on stakes (Sripada and Stanley 2012: 6-9). While simpler vignettes 
could be constructed to nullify this concern (see BRIDGE as an example), Sripada and Stanley 
also worry that given high stakes, participants may attribute knowledge simply because higher 
stakes tend to encourage additional evidence-gathering practices, outside those mentioned in 
the vignette, by individuals open to severe risks (Sripada and Stanley 2012: 9-11). It is for this 
reason that the authors crafted the “ignorant” version of PINE NUTS utilized in this study. 
However, the “ignorant” high stakes situation, in which Hannah does not have a belief about 
her severe allergy, is dubious. In a world where pine nuts can kill, are used by restaurants 
and listed in menus, and can be readily perceived by non-experts, we expect Hannah to 
be in a position, regardless of her additional attempts to gain evidence, to have a belief 
about her allergy. A world with all the features mentioned in the previous sentence, and 
where restaurants did not protect their customers from deadly allergies caused by genetics, 
out of fear from the law and social sanction, is a very different world from our own. Most 
importantly, such a counterfactual world would strain the high EI participant from being able 
to empathize with the epistemic situation of the protagonist.  
This concluding section highlighted the ways in which experimental artifacts—the vignettes 
used to assay the relationship between emotional intelligence and stakes—distorted the results 
of our study. Beginning with psychology, a feature of the psyche was identified that has been 
described by Roberts and Wood as a virtue. Emotional intelligence, while an original addition 
to the field of epistemology, has the benefit of being empirically grounded and tested based on 
philosophically-significant criteria. If research into the virtues is to bear fruit and reply to the 
4. Lessons for the 
Future 
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critiques of John Doris (who challenges the existence of such character traits in [Doris 2002]), 
then virtue theorists need to become familiar with empirical research, including experimental 
design. Simply knowing the latest science on character is not enough—philosophers need to be 
creative, looking to provide analysis based upon a variety of evidence and evidence-gathering 
techniques. This paper stands as a signpost pointing towards the fecundity of emotional 
intelligence and the significance of experimental philosophy for those who tread in Aristotle’s 
footsteps. 
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